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Christian Quast has recently embarked on the project of systematizing the debate about 
the notion of expertise, an extremely fascinating and important issue addressed by scholars 
of many disciplines yet still in need of an interdisciplinary take. He sheds light on a 
number of relevant features of this notion and defends what he calls a “balanced” 
account of expertise, namely one that defines this concept in light of an expert’s 
dispositions, manifestations of their dispositions, and social role or function.  
 
In doing so, Quast argues against three versions of reductionism about expertise: 
ReductionismF, which reduces expertise to the function an expert fulfills in a community; 
ReductionismM, which confuses expertise with the manifestation of an expert’s competence; 
and ReductionismD, in which expertise boils down to possessing suitable dispositions in a 
specific domain—that is, practical abilities or epistemic properties such as knowledge, 
true beliefs, or understanding.  
 
As an attempt at bringing together interdisciplinary discussions of a specific topic, Quast’s 
project is ambitious and provides a genuine contribution to the ongoing discussions 
around the topic of expertise in philosophy, psychology, and the social sciences. 
Inevitably, Quast’s rich analysis and original proposal raise a number of worries that 
deserve to be further inspected.  
 
In this critical reply, I offer some considerations that put pressure on Quast’s balanced 
account and hopefully help anyone interested in this debate take a step forward toward 
explaining what it takes for one to be an expert. The reply is structured as follows. First, I 
argue that his allegedly balanced view is liable to a potentially compromising tension 
between its function component and the ingredients of objective expertise (§1).  
 
Then, I show that Quast’s threefold characterization of an objective expert is too strong, 
as it imposes conditions that several individuals whom we would consider experts are 
unable to fulfill (§2). Finally, I provide reasons in favor of endorsing an objective account 
of expertise in light of some specific features of our society, and show how this account 
can take into due consideration the different services experts ordinarily perform (§3). 
 
Against a Balanced Account of Expertise 
  
The first consideration I want to offer in response to Quast is that, to put it simply, he 
cannot have his cake and eat it too. Quast devotes a good amount of his paper to 
convincing us that the aforementioned reductionist accounts of expertise are flawed and 
that a more plausible story of what it takes for one to be an expert has to rely upon “an 
entangled interrelationship” between an expert’s dispositions and the contextual service 
function they perform in a community (2019, 412). In this section, I purport to show that 











Let us recall Quast’s comprehensive definition of an expert, which is offered right at the 
end of his article: 
 
(ExpertF-C-M) Someone e is an objective expert in contrast to some client c within a 
certain domain d only if e is undefeatedly disposed to fulfill a particular service 
function in d for c adequately at the moment of assessment (412). 
 
At first glance, Quast’s move is attractive. In the end, we usually think of experts as 
subjects who are more competent than most people in a domain,1 but, at the same time, 
we grant one the status of an expert (i) based on their social role and (ii) against a relevant 
contrast class of individuals who are unable to provide a similar service. In contrast, both 
ReductionismF and ReductionismD are liable to counterexamples.  
 
The former is wrongly committed to granting the status of an expert translator to a 
subject who manages a translation-services company by delegating any job to unknown 
freelancers and lacks any translating skills (402). The latter is wrongly committed to grant 
the status of a wine expert to an individual who can correctly estimate the value of a wine 
cellar without having the ability or the willingness to provide an explanation of their 
evaluation (407).  
 
In contrast, neither the manager nor the wine consultant satisfies the requirements of 
expertise on the balanced account. The former is not an expert, because he lacks the 
dispositions required to provide translating services—that is, knowledge of at least two 
languages, translating skills, and the like. The latter is not an expert, because her 
competence to assess the value of wine cellars gets defeated by her inability or 
unwillingness to give an account of her services at the moment of assessment (407).2 
 
Dispositions and Functions in Tension 
 
However, a closer inspection of Quast’s proposed view of expertise reveals a tension 
between the disposition component and the function component. Consider the 
disposition component first and, in particular, his analysis of objective expertise.  
 
He conceives of objective expertise as encompassing the following three elements: (i) primary 
competence, which relates to an expert’s reliability in delivering the services they are 
supposed to provide; (ii) secondary competence, which relates to an expert’s ability to 
explain their services to a client, thereby establishing and fostering mutual trust; and (iii) 
                                               
1 It may be helpful to note that this competence may boil down to different properties and dispositions 
depending on the specifics of the domain under consideration. For instance, the competence of an expert 
carpenter might involve a good deal of experience, practical skills, and know-how, whereas the competence 
of an expert in contemporary history might be mostly based on great instruction, analytical skills, and 
theoretical understanding of the extant literature and recent historical events.  
2 In the analysis of his wine-expert case, Quast points out that we might ascribe a default expertise to the 
wine consultant yet withdraw our attribution of expertise if she refuses to provide suitable explanations of 
her evaluation (407–8). 
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intellectually virtuous character, which ensures that an expert is willing to manifest both the 
above competences when appropriate.  
 
For the time being, let’s set aside a reasonable concern one might have about Quast’s 
unduly narrow characterization of the role intellectual-character virtues play in his 
account of objective expertise.3  
 
The balanced account is quite demanding, as according to it someone is an objective 
expert insofar as they are competent in a given domain, able to provide their clients with 
tailored explanations of their services, and willing to do so in the appropriate 
circumstances. Going back to the wine-consultant case, it should be evident that the 
reason why the consultant might fail to be an expert is that she lacks secondary 
competence, intellectual virtues, or both, as her inability or unwillingness to share any 
considerations about her estimate of the wine cellar with the client demonstrates.  
 
As anticipated, on the balanced account these considerations about objective expertise 
need to be balanced, or implemented, with further remarks on the service function of 
experts. Here Quast takes quite a concessive route and offers the case of a “private 
expert”: in the example, Christian Quast’s wife asks him to find someone who can fix or 
replace a leaky drain pipe; he approaches the issue by relying on his father-in-law, whose 
craft hobby enables him to solve the problem (410).  
 
Quast is ready to admit that his father-in-law is more of an expert than himself and his 
wife, yet he goes so far as to concede that the man satisfies the requirements of a 
function-based account of expertise.  
 
The function component plays a key role in this account, in that the service his father-in-
law fulfills determines  
 
(i) a relevant contrast class of individuals who lack the disposition to perform a 
specific function—that is, the class composed of Christian and his wife;  
(ii) a proper characterization of the domain of expertise, namely that of replacing 
leaky drain pipes;  
(iii) the degree of reliability required for Christian’s father-in-law to fulfill the 
function—that is, Christian’s own standards for replacement of leaky drain pipes;  
(iv) a range of similar situations in which the man is supposed to be able to deliver 
his services; and  
(v) minimum conditions for him to fulfill the individual requirements of objective 
expertise, which in this case require relative competence to repair the leaky drain 
pipe at the Quasts’ place.  
 
                                               
3 As I have argued elsewhere (see Croce 2019, §§4–5), we have reasons to think the character virtues of an 









Thus, on Quast’s balanced account, possession of expertise depends on contextual factors, 
such as the specifics of the contrast class of laypeople and the situation in which expertise 
is ascribed, as well as on practical factors, such as the needs of the relevant clients and the 
urgency of the required service. These elements determine whether a hobbyist-
craftsperson is an expert in repairing leaky drain pipes or a wine consultant is an expert in 
value assessment of wine cellars.  
 
Problems of Balance in Expertise 
 
Unfortunately, the “balanced” account emerging from these components is less tenable 
than one might have initially thought. The first problem is that it is hard to make sense of 
the notion of objective expertise on such a functionalist account. For possession of 
objective expertise in a domain becomes hostage to two inherently relative elements, namely 
(i) the service someone is disposed and willing to fulfill for (ii) a community—or contrast 
class, to stick with Quast’s vocabulary.  
 
On standard comparative accounts of expertise, (ii) obviously plays a major role, as 
possession of expertise merely amounts to being more of an expert in a (broader or 
narrower) domain than some group of people and therefore expertise reduces to an 
entirely comparative notion.  
 
In such a perspective, both Christian’s father-in-law and a plumbing engineer are experts 
in repairing leaky drain pipes although the latter’s competence is much broader than the 
former’s. For each of them is more of an expert than the respective contrast class, which 
includes Christian and his wife in the former case versus, say, most people in the 
engineer’s town, district, or state in the latter case. Clearly, though, this diagnosis comes at 
the cost of giving up on the inquiry into the objective requirements of expertise. 
 
Despite including (ii) in his account of expertise, Quast purports to endorse a view that 
makes room for objective expertise. Thus, he has to prevent this relative condition from 
delivering the standard comparative diagnosis in situations such as the leaky-drain-pipes 
one.  
 
He does so through the service-function element—that is, (i)—by arguing that one is an 
objective expert insofar as they are undefeatedly disposed to serve a relevant need of the 
respective community or contrast class. Thus, on the balanced account we can still 
attribute objective expertise to both Christian’s father-in-law and a plumbing engineer as 
long as they can fix leaky drain pipes in the respective community or contrast class.  
 
I am unpersuaded by this move for two reasons. The first is that introducing a relative 
element such as (i) does not neutralize the anti-objective effect of (ii); rather, it is likely to 
intensify such an effect by adding a further relative variable to the account. The second is 
that the only way for Quast to grant expertise to his father-in-law and a plumbing 
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Specifically, he has to concede that his father-in-law is an expert because he serves the 
community composed of Christian and his wife by doing something like “repairing leaky 
drain pipes at the Quasts’ place” or “repairing leaky drain pipes of some kind.” In 
contrast, the plumbing engineer is an expert because he serves a wider community by, say, 
“repairing leaky drain pipes of any kind.”  
 
This move would thus generate an unnecessary proliferation of domains of expertise 
depending on the specific needs of any relevant contrast class. For example, my auntie 
Renata, who helps most inhabitants of a rural village in Liguria react to (i.e., “like”) and 
comment on the content appearing in their Facebook news feed, would possess objective 
expertise in something like “adding likes and comments on posts on Facebook” relative 
to the contrast class composed of the citizens of Bevena, although her competence 
regarding social networks ends pretty much there.  
 
These considerations show that the balanced account narrows the notion of expertise to 
the point that we lose our grip on what is objective about an expert’s competence. To 
avoid this result and save both the functionalist spirit of his view and its context 
sensitivity, Quast should abandon the idea of making room for objective expertise and 
endorse an entirely comparative account. This is why, in a word, Quast cannot have his 
cake and eat it too. 
 
On the Fundamental Ingredients of Expertise 
 
The balanced account suffers from a second problem pertaining to the aforementioned 
ingredients of expertise, namely primary competence, secondary competence, and 
intellectual virtues (see also Hardwig 1994, 92). According to ExpertF-C-M, expertise 
requires an undefeated disposition to fulfill a particular service function adequately at the 
moment of assessment.  
 
In turn, all three ingredients feature in the undefeated-disposition requirement, in that 
lacking any of them defeats the attribution of expertise. In this section, I demonstrate that 
this account is too strong, as it poses unduly restrictive requirements for one to be an 
expert. In particular, I worry about secondary competence and what Quast calls 
“intellectually virtuous character” as necessary components of expertise.  
 
Let us consider secondary, or explanatory, competence first: the ability to give an account 
of one’s performances. We have already seen that on the balanced account, failing to 
display secondary competence defeats expertise because, as the wine-consultant case 
shows, we expect from experts that they can give us explanations regarding their services.  
 
However, the plausibility of this understanding of expertise entirely rests on the specifics 
of the example Quast introduces. In the proposed case, a subject challenges the wine 
consultant’s evaluation because of its inconsistency with the subject’s expectations and 
the testimony of the former owner of the cellar. Notice, though, that the disposition to 









set of abilities than the ones necessary to fulfill one’s service function successfully. The 
former set includes such intellectual virtues as a sensitivity to a layperson’s epistemic 
resources, communicative clarity, intellectual generosity, and possibly other abilities.4  
 
A civil engineer could well possess primary competence in demolishing or rebuilding a 
bridge and the ability to discuss it with other experts yet lack the competence to provide 
effective explanations of their techniques, strategies, and related risks to a lay audience. 
Something similar happens in sports. A lot of amazing athletes can do extremely 
complicated things that are generally out of reach for most human beings, yet they may 
not be able properly to account for what they do.  
 
They can show you these actions hundreds of times, but if you ask them to tell you how 
they do that, you might feel extremely disappointed or confused by their explanations. 
This is why not all the greatest sport heroes are good coaches and not all the best civil 
engineers can effectively account for what they do to a lay audience. For as I will stress in 
the final section, primary competence and secondary competence are, in a sense, different 
kinds of expertise. 
 
A Private or People’s Expertise 
 
The required combination of these competences for a proper understanding of expertise 
on Quast’s view is somewhat surprising if we bear in mind that he wants to confer 
objective expertise to “private experts,” who can offer us quite specific services such as 
fixing some leaky drain pipes. In Quast’s private-expert case, it seems odd to require that 
Christian’s father-in-law be able to give an account of how he is going to fix the pipe in 
order to fulfill the function of a private expert.  
 
For, on the one hand, the relevant contrast class includes two individuals, namely 
Christian and his wife, who—as we are told—are both inexperienced in these kinds of 
handicraft matters. On the other, Christian’s father-in-law might even lack the necessary 
abilities properly to explain how he will repair the pipes.  
 
These considerations make it hard to see why giving an appropriate account of the 
provided service should be necessary for Christian’s father-in-law to be an expert on a 
functionalist view that aims at being in a position to grant private experts objective 
expertise. 
 
Consider now the other ingredient of expertise on Quast’s view, namely one’s intellectual 
character in the sense of their willingness to manifest primary and secondary competence 
when appropriate. The above considerations about the intellectual abilities required for 
one to deliver proper explanations of one’s service should provide sufficient reason to 
consider possession of an intellectually virtuous character as a relevant component of the 
competences required for one to be an expert rather than as mere willingness to manifest 
                                               
4 These virtues are part of what I have elsewhere called novice-oriented abilities (see Croce 2019, 13). 
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such competences.5 Thus, in the remainder of this critical notice I shall simply tackle the 
willingness component and, in particular, the willingness to manifest secondary competence 
when appropriate.  
 
Suppose a physicist, call him Ivory Tower, is completely reluctant to share anything 
related to his work with people, especially laypersons. Ivory’s social interactions are 
limited to what’s required for him to keep his position at his institution. Ivory works in 
optics, and, in particular, he is developing reliable ways to see through walls by using 
special cameras. More specifically, he is working on a project that would allow rescue 
teams to individuate people when the terrain is dangerous and would allow cars to avoid 
accidents by identifying obstacles or vehicles from around the corner.  
 
Quast’s view commits us to conclude that Ivory lacks expertise in optics or whatever 
more specific subfield he is working in because he fails to display the required willingness 
to give an account of his performances when appropriate. This verdict is unsatisfying in 
general, as it strikes us as evident that Ivory’s extremely sophisticated work in optics 
should suffice to grant him the status of an expert.  
 
Furthermore, the verdict is unsatisfying even from the perspective of a functionalist 
account of expertise, as Quast’s purports to be. For despite lacking willingness to explain 
his work to others, Ivory is surely serving laypeople’s needs. He does so by attempting to 
solve problems in optics and providing the community with new resources rather than by 
making himself accountable for his work to a lay audience, but this merely amounts to 
another relevant way an expert can serve their community, as I will argue in the next 
section. Thus, since there seem to be no good reasons to deny Ivory the expertise he has 
acquired through years of intense work, we can conclude that the willingness to manifest 
secondary competence is not a necessary condition for one to possess expertise.  
 
Two allegedly key ingredients in Quast’s account of expertise, namely secondary 
competence and the willingness to manifest that competence when appropriate, are less 
fundamental than one might have initially thought. In fact, they should not be considered 
necessary requirements for one to be an expert in some domain. In the final section, I 
shall explore some implications of the considerations offered so far, with the aim of 
contributing to reaching a better understanding of the notion of, and the role of, an 
expert in the context of the society we currently live in.  
 
Expertise Today: Toward an Objective Approach 
 
Many reputable scholars characterize the age we live in as a post-truth era (Fuller 2018) in 
which the very idea of expertise is dead (Nichols 2017), as it has been replaced by a free 
                                               
5 For the sake of completeness, it should also be noted that other intellectual virtues may be required for 
one to possess primary competence in a domain, especially in those fields in which competence involves 
some propositional knowledge and understanding. In particular, I have in mind virtues such as 
thoroughness, intellectual perseverance, creativity, open-mindedness, intellectual curiosity, and autonomy 









market in information and self-attributed competences that takes place in the blogosphere 
(Coady 2012), the internet (Lynch 2016), and more recently social media, where fake news 
easily proliferates (Vosoughi et al. 2018). As Nichols thoroughly describes (see §7), we’re 
surrounded by a gigantic amount of news and by experts who are more and more 
specialized in any domain, and yet we know less than before and distrust expertise.  
 
If there is one thing epistemologists can surely do—in fact, must do—to counteract the 
advance of post-truth thinking in our society, it is attempting to reach a better 
understanding of the notion of expertise. Such a service would not solve all the problems, 
yet it would at least contribute to indicating where genuine competence lies and who has 
it and therefore to marking a neater distinction between experts and charlatans. This is 
why I am largely sympathetic to Quast’s efforts, as it is clear that we need experts now 
more than ever.  
 
It is for the same reasons, though, that I believe Quast’s balanced account of expertise is 
on the wrong track. In this final section, I make two points to suggest how we should 
redirect our search for a better account of expertise. First, I explain why we need a more 
objective account of expertise. Second, I suggest an alternative way to look at the service 
experts are supposed to fulfill in our communities. 
 
The first consideration is called for by the peculiar situation we’re currently in. As I 
showed in §1, the functionalist spirit of the balanced account of expertise ends up 
undermining the very notion of objective expertise that Goldman has in mind when he 
argues that “being an expert is not simply a matter of veritistic superiority to most of the 
community. Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment must be reached” 
(2001, 91).  
 
Since Goldman admits that it might be difficult to determine where the bar has to be set, 
one might suspect the balanced account has a clear advantage over a purely objective 
approach to expertise, as on Quast’s view being suitably disposed and willing to serve the 
need of a relevant contrast class is all it takes for one to achieve the status of an expert.  
 
This is a mistake though because it is far from obvious that a novice or group of novices 
can reliably ascribe expertise to someone who is supposed to be more competent than 
they are in a domain. In other words, the more context sensitive and subject sensitive is 
the process of expertise attribution, the higher is the risk of misplacing trust in non-
experts. This is an unwelcome consequence of the balanced account—a consequence that 
makes the account lose its alleged positional advantage over objective approaches to 
expertise. 
 
Against the Balanced Account 
 
My proposed epistemic consideration against the balanced account of expertise can be 
supported by a further reason for favoring an objective account of expertise—namely, the 
fact that this latter account provides a community with robust criteria for assessing who is 
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to be trusted to deliver a service in any field. This translates into a practical advantage for 
the entire community, which can create ways to signal who and where experts are6 and 
therefore help lay members navigate the current ocean of self-attributed competences and 
epistemic egalitarian ideals. Needless to say, this consideration does not suffice as a 
remedy against the detrimental effects of post-truth thinking; yet it should at least offer 
motivation for directing our efforts toward an objective approach to expertise rather than 
a “balanced” one. 
 
The second consideration brings the distinction between primary and secondary 
competence back on stage. In a realist, or objective, approach, the attribution of expertise 
cannot depend on the specific function one is required to fulfill relative to some contrast 
class in a particular context. Some handy craftsperson who has learned how to repair the 
very same leaky drain pipe at one’s home over the years does not count as an expert, 
because their competence is too limited and unreliable in similar situations in which a 
proficient plumber is expected to succeed.  
 
Yet, an objective account is in a position to distinguish at least two broad kinds of 
expertise, namely the expertise of those who can reliably provide some sort of service in a 
domain and those who can explain what’s going on in a domain to others, especially 
laypeople. Call the former domain-oriented expertise and the latter novice-oriented expertise.  
 
The set of domain-oriented experts includes reliable plumbers, scuba divers, wine tasters, 
lawyers, doctors, musicians, and scholars, among others. Their expertise consists of an 
ability to serve the needs of a community in their respective domains—that is, what 
Quast calls primary competence. In particular, the function of domain-oriented experts 
encompasses two main roles:  
 
(i) that of expert practitioners, who address specific needs of the community 
members—for example, repairing leaky drain pipes, maintaining or restoring 
health, and performing jazz music; and  
(ii) that of expert innovators, whose job is to improve the community’s capacity to 
serve the needs of their members by developing new resources, advancing the 
techniques, or carrying out groundbreaking research in a domain—for example, 
creating more-robust drain pipes, developing new therapies against cancer, or 
composing jazz music.  
 
As should be evident, both functions demand that the subject have intellectual or 
practical dispositions to reliably deliver the required services. However, these roles are 
quite different, and not all expert practitioners are also expert innovators, and vice versa. 
Thus, any individual who fulfills either role possesses domain-oriented expertise. 
 
                                               
6 As Goldman points out, this is the role of academic certifications, professional accreditations, work 









In contrast, the set of novice-oriented experts includes those individuals who have 
secondary competence, namely the capacity to help laypeople understand the services 
domain-oriented experts provide to the community. This set typically includes teachers 
and science popularizers, but all domain-oriented experts who possess a sufficient 
amount of secondary competence may have novice-oriented expertise too.  
 
However, possessing domain-oriented expertise does not ensure that one also has novice-
oriented expertise, as the wine-consultant and civil-engineer cases discussed in §2 
demonstrate. For this service activates a different set of dispositions—namely, novice-





The proposed categorization of the two main services experts fulfill in a community 
allows us to take into due consideration the functionalist element of expertise without 
giving up on an objective perspective that grants conceptual primacy to the dispositional 
component of expertise. We all wish to be surrounded by subjects who can offer clear 
explanations of how they are going to satisfy our needs, but we’d better also have an 
account that explains why some experts greatly serve the domain-oriented needs of our 
community without being able to serve the novice-oriented ones.  
 
This is not only important for us to improve the explanatory power of our definition of 
expertise, but also for a community to evaluate how to deploy its resources to ensure that 
both kinds of experts are in a suitable position to fulfill their respective service function.  
 
This reply to Quast’s insightful paper aimed at shedding light on some limits of his account 
and sketching a strategy to accept Quast’s suggestions about the necessary balance between a 
dispositional dimension and a functionalist dimension of expertise within an objective 
approach. Far from offering a comprehensive alternative account, I hope this reply can 
encourage others to address the important issues Quast has raised in his paper and can 
contribute to improving our understanding of the notion of expertise. 
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